## 1nc

### 1

#### Farm bill will pass – EPA decision gives it momentum

Wasson 11-19 – Staff writer at The Hill (Erik, “EPA ethanol decision pushes farm bill toward finish line”, November 19 of 2013, <http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/agriculture/190777-epa-ethanol-decision-pushes-farm-bill-toward-finish-line>)

The Environmental Protection Agency’s preliminary decision to reduce renewable fuels blending requirements has increased momentum to get a farm bill done this year, the top House negotiator on the measure said Tuesday. Rep. Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) argued that the ethanol decision, which is contributing to dropping corn prices, is helping all sides to come together behind a strong farm safety net. He added an agreement is needed this week to pass a farm bill before the Dec. 13 Christmas recess target date. Senate Agriculture Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) also told reporters Tuesday she is trying to get a framework agreement with the four top committee leaders this week or early next week. “That’s been my problem early on, that there was two different camps on how we should proceed and they’re absolute. Suddenly, with the change in weather patterns, production yields and now government mandated demand being adjusted down, suddenly that’s driving all of us together,” Lucas said. He said that the vulnerability of corn producers is helping resolve regional differences over whether the House or Senate farm subsidy approaches should be used. The downward prices also mean that the farm safety net as scored by the Congressional Budget Office will be more costly—giving negotiators an added incentive to complete a deal before CBO takes away some of their deficit-cutting bragging rights. The current bill cuts $13 billion to $20 billion from farm programs. On Friday, the EPA proposed draft 2014 blending volumes under the federal Renewable Fuel Standard that are lower than the 2013 requirements, and far less than called for in a 2007 law that expanded the mandate. The EPA is proposing to require 15.21 billion gallons in 2014, down from 16.55 billion gallons in 2013, marking the first time the agency has lowered the target from the prior year.

Plan trades off

Susan Page 13, USA Today, “How Obama can avoid the second-term curse,” 1-15-13, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/01/14/obama-second-term-curse/1834765/

"By the time a second term rolls around, the illusions about a president have largely evaporated," says Robert Dallek, one of those invited to the dinner and the author of influential biographies of Presidents Lyndon Johnson and John Kennedy. "In second terms, the big problems that confront the country, and they're always there, more or less catch up with the incumbent."¶ To be sure, some presidents have scored significant achievements in their second terms, from the tax code overhaul signed by Reagan to the balanced federal budget during Clinton's watch. But advisers who have been there say the rhythms and political dynamics of the second term are different from the first.¶"In the first term, you're running for re-election," says Ken Duberstein, White House chief of staff for Reagan during his second term. "In the second term, you're running for legacy." That impulse — "whether it's hubris or overreach or over-interpreting a mandate" — sometimes contributes to stumbles.¶ John Podesta, chief of staff for Clinton in his second term, says there's no "unifying physics theory" to explain the second-term curse, a concept that has become so accepted it has its own Wikipedia page. Despite that conventional wisdom, he says second terms also pose an opportunity for a president to deploy a more seasoned staff and exploit more executive powers.¶ USA TODAY asked top White House aides to Reagan, Clinton and Bush during their second terms for their tips, some reflecting hard lessons learned during their time in the West Wing. Here's what they told us.¶ 1. Watch the clock¶ The Constitution says there are four years to a second term, but political reality says a president's ability to command public attention and compel congressional action begins to ebb well before that. "People tend to get tired of their president in the second term," says Frank Donatelli, second-term White House political adviser to Reagan.¶ "Certainly history has proven that second-term presidents typically get the most accomplished in their first year and a little in their second and then not a lot accomplished as the party fights over who the next standard-bearer will be," says Sara Taylor Fagen, political adviser in Bush's second term.¶ That means Obama's major legislative initiatives for his second term probably need to be spotlighted in his inaugural address next week and detailed in the State of the Union speech that follows next month. His opportunities are likely to shrink as time passes, and fast.¶ "It's the Benjamin Button theory of the second term," says former Clinton White House aide Chris Lehane, a reference to the 2008 movie and F. Scott Fitzgerald short story. "You have a year to 16 months, max, to do anything, at least domestically. You're going to age in reverse."¶ At the midpoint of Bush's second term, press secretary Dana Perino saw attendance at daily White House briefings drop as reporters shifted to the 2008 campaign. "Toward the end, I said, 'If we are on the front page of the paper, we have done something terribly wrong or have a huge problem,'" says Perino, now co-host of The Five on Fox News Channel.¶ Another potential problem: The midterm congressional elections. The president's party often suffers big losses in the sixth year of a presidency, although Democrats already may have taken much of that hit in the 2010 elections, when they lost control of the House of Representatives. Democrats probably will have more muscle in Congress for the next two years than in the final two of Obama's term.¶ "There's a little bit of a feeling that you become chopped liver in your seventh and eighth years as the campaign heats up," says Podesta, who ran Obama's transition operation four years ago and is now chair of the Center for American Progress, a liberal-leaning think tank. "The play is going to move on."¶ 2. Pick a priority¶ The president can do something in his second term, the veterans say, but not everything. Fighting too many battles could mean winning none.

#### New farm bill key to prevent a food price spike

Nelson 10/17/13 [Joe Nelson, writer for WEAU news, “Obama, ag industry waiting for new Farm bill,” http://www.weau.com/home/headlines/Obama-ag-industry-waiting-for-new-Farm-Bill-228259521.html]

With the government shutdown over, farmers are still waiting for a deal to be made.¶ President Obama listed the farm bill as one of his top priorities to address, which could protect farmers and low income families.¶ “We should pass a farm bill, one that American farmers and ranchers can depend on, one that protects vulnerable children and adults in times of need, one that gives rural communities opportunities to grow and the long-term certainty that they deserve. Again, the Senate's already passed a solid bipartisan bill. It's got support from democrats and republicans. It's sitting in the House waiting for passage. If House republicans have ideas that they think would improve the farm bill, let's see them. Let's negotiate. What are we waiting for? Let's get this done,” Obama said.¶ Farmers said if they struggle without a farm bill, it could cause food prices to spike, force some out of the industry and damage the economy.¶ “If the milk price falls below a certain level, the Farm bill does help support farmers during a time of an economic crisis when prices drop too low,” Chippewa County U.W. Extension Crops and Soils Educator, Jerry Clark¶ The current, five-year Farm bill was temporarily extended, but both farmers and Clark said with much to lose, a new one is needed.¶ “Any time we can get the new bill passed, it's definitely going to help because there's always new changes in agriculture, as far as commodities or practices that need to be implemented,” Clark said. “So those types of things should be passed to keep up with the current trends in agriculture.¶ Durand corn and soybean farmer and Value Implement dealer TJ Poeschel says not having a new farm bill and reverting to a bill from 1949 could cut down profits or even force some farmers to quit or retire.

#### Extinction

Brown 9 (Lester R, Founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=civilization-food-shortages)

The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation¶ One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis.¶ For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization.¶ I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

### 2

#### Text: The United States federal government should provide decentralized integrated solar thermal assistance to Mexico.

#### xSolar thermal technology solves the aff better – it’s more efficient than photovoltaic.

Richard Klein1 and Mariela Vasquez2, Spring-xx-2010, founder, Quixotic Systems Inc, inventor and entrepreneur1, engineering team, Quixotic Systems, B.A. in Mechanical Engineering @ University of Virginia2, “Solar Thermal: A New Sustainable Solution for Urban Multi-Family Buildings,” <http://www.quixotic-systems.com/imgs/nesea-article.pdf>

Advantages of solar thermal over solar electric (PV) Over the past few years, solar electric (PV) systems have gained greater momentum over solar thermal systems due to government incentives and more attention from the media. However, due to the diversity of buildings and their demands, PV systems are not always the most efficient or financially beneficial renewable energy source. Solar thermal systems are capable of providing better efficiency and return in larger residential buildings where the domestic hot water load is greater than the electricity con sumption (see table 1).

#### PV causes massive environmental damage

**Mulvaney et al** 1/14/09 (Dustin Mulvaney, Ph.D.—Switzer Fellow, Vicki Bolam—Technical Writer, Monica Cendejas—Project Manager, SVTC, Sheila Davis—Executive Director, SVTC, Lauren Ornelas—Campaign Director, SVTC, Simon Kim—SVTC Intern, Stanford University, Serena Mau—SVTC Intern, University of California, Berkeley, William Rowan—SVTC Intern, Stanford University, Esperanza Sanz, SVTC Intern, De Anza College, Peter Satre—SVTC Intern, Stanford University, Ananth Sridhar—SVTC Intern, Stanford University, Dean Young—SVTC Intern, Stanford University. All work for Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition. “Towrds a Just and Sustainable Solar Energy Industry”. http://www.etoxics.org/site/DocServer/Silicon\_Valley\_Toxics\_Coalition\_-\_Toward\_a\_Just\_and\_Sust.pdf?docID=821)

Silicon-based solar PV production involves many of the same materials as the microelectronics industry and therefore presents many of the same hazards. At the same time, emerging thin-film and nanotech-based cells pose unknown health and environmental dangers. This section provides an overview of the hazards posed by current and emerging solar PV production technologies. A. Crystalline Silicon (c-Si) As with the production of silicon chips, production of c-Si wafers begins with the mining of silica (SiO2), found in the environment as sand or quartz.† Silica is refined at high temperatures to remove the O2 and produce metallurgical grade silicon, which is approximately 99.6 percent pure. However, silicon for semiconductor use must be much purer. Higher purities are achieved through a chemical process that exposes metallurgical grade silicon to hydrochloric acid and copper to produce a gas called trichlorosilane (HSiCl3). The trichlorosilane is then distilled to remove remaining impurities, which typically include chlorinated metals of aluminum, iron, and carbon. It is finally heated or “reduced” with hydrogen to produce silane (SiH4) gas. The silane gas is either heated again to make molten silicon, used to grow monocrystalline silicon crystals, or used as an input for amorphous silicon (see next section). The next step is to produce crystals of either monocrystalline or multicrystalline silicon. Monocrystalline silicon rods are pulled from molten silicon, cooled, and suspended in a reactor at high temperature and high pressure. Silane gas is then introduced into the reactor to deposit additional silicon onto the rods until they “grow” to a specified diameter. To produce multicrystalline silicon, molten silicon is poured into crucibles and cooled into blocks or ingots. Both processes produce silicon crystals that are extremely pure (from 99.99999 to 99.9999999 percent), which is ideal for microchips, but far more than required by the PV industry. The high temperatures required for c-Si production make it an extremely energy intensive and expensive process, and also produces large amounts of waste. As much as 80 percent of the initial metallurgical grade silicon is lost in the process.21 Sawing c-Si wafers creates a significant amount of waste silicon dust called kerf, and up to 50 percent of the material is lost in air and water used to rinse wafers.22 This process may generate silicon particulate matter that will pose inhalation problems for production workers and those who clean and maintain equipment. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has set exposure limits to keep ambient dust levels low and recommends the use of respiratory masks, but it has been suggested that, despite the use of respiratory masks, workers remain overexposed to silicon dust.23The use of silane gas is the most significant hazard in the production of c-Si because it is extremely explosive and presents a potential danger to workers and communities.24 Accidental releases of silane have been known to spontaneously explode, and the semiconductor industry reports several silane incidents every year.25 Further back in the silicon supply chain, the production of silane and trichlorosilane results in waste silicon tetrachloride (SiCl4), an extremely toxic substance that reacts violently with water, causes skin burns, and is a respiratory, skin, and eye irritant.26 Although it is easily recovered and reused as an input for silane production, in places with little or no environmental regulation, silicon tetrachloride can constitute an extreme environmental hazard. As the Washington Post reported in March 2008 (see above), polysilicon manufacturing is expanding rapidly in China, but facilities to recycle silicon tetrachloride and other toxic outputs are not keeping pace.27 The extremely potent greenhouse gas sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) is used to clean the reactors used in silicon production. The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) considers sulfur hexafluoride to be the most potent greenhouse gas per molecule; one ton of sulfur hexafluoride has a greenhouse effect equivalent to that of 25,000 tons of CO2.28 It can react with silicon to make silicon tetrafluoride (SiF4) and sulfur difluoride (SF2), or be reduced to tetrafluorosilane (SiF4) and sulfur dioxide (SO2). SO2 releases can cause acid rain, so scrubbers are required to limit air emissions in facilities that use it. It is imperative that a replacement for sulfur hexafluoride be found, because accidental or fugitive emissions† will greatly undermine the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions gained by using solar power. Other chemicals used in the production of crystalline silicon that require special handling and disposal procedures include the following: Large quantities of sodium hydroxide (NaOH) are used to remove the sawing damage on the silicon wafer surfaces. In some cases, potassium hydroxide (KOH) is used instead. These caustic chemicals are dangerous to the eyes, lungs, and skin. Corrosive chemicals like hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid, nitric acid, and hydrogen fluoride are used to remove impurities from and clean semiconductor materials. Toxic phosphine (PH3) or arsine (AsH3) gas is used in the doping of the semiconductor material. Though these are used in small quantities, inadequate containment or accidental release poses occupational risks.29 Other chemicals used or produced in the doping process include phosphorous oxychloride, phosphorous trichloride, boron bromide, and boron trichloride. Isopropyl alcohol is used to clean c-Si wafers. The surface of the wafer is oxidized to silicon dioxide to protect the solar cell. Lead is often used in solar PV electronic circuits for wiring, solder-coated copper strips, and some lead-based printing pastes. Small quantities of silver and aluminum are used to make the electrical contacts on the cell. Chemicals released in fugitive air emissions by known manufacturing facilities include trichloroethane, acetone, ammonia, and isopropyl alcohol.30

**Collapse causes extinction**

**Ehrlich & Ehrlich 13 –** Professor of Biology & Senior Research Scientist in Biology @ Stanford University (Paul R. Ehrlich (President of the Center for Conservation Biology @ Stanford University) & Anne H. Ehrlich, “Can a collapse of global civilization be avoided?,” Proceedings of the Royal Society Biological Sciences, Proc. R. Soc. B 2013 280, published online 9 January 2013)//HA

Virtually every past civilization has eventually undergone collapse, a loss of socio-political-economic complexity usually accompanied by a dramatic decline in population size [1]. Some, such as those of Egypt and China, have recovered from collapses at various stages; others, such as that of Easter Island or the Classic Maya, were apparently permanent [1,2]. All those previous collapses were local or regional; elsewhere, other societies and civilizations persisted unaffected. Sometimes, as in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, new civilizations rose in succession. In many, if not most, cases, overexploitation of the environment was one proximate or an ultimate cause [3].

But today, for the first time, **humanity’s global civilization**—the worldwide, increasingly interconnected, highly technological society in which we all are to one degree or another, embedded—is threatened with **collapse** byan array of **environmental problems.** Humankind finds itself engaged in what Prince Charles described as ‘an act of suicide on a grand scale’ [4], facing what the UK’s Chief Scientific Advisor John Beddington called a ‘perfect storm’ of environmental problems [5]. The most serious of these problems show signs of rapidly escalating severity, especially climate disruption. But other elements could potentially also contribute to a collapse: an accelerating **extinction** of animal and plant populations and species, which could lead to a loss of ecosystem services essential for human survival; land degradation and land-use change; a pole-to-pole spread of toxic compounds; ocean acidification and eutrophication (dead zones); worsening of some aspects of the epidemiological environment (factors that make human populations susceptible to infectious diseases); depletion of increasingly scarce resources [6,7], including especially groundwater, which is being overexploited in many key agricultural areas [8]; and resource wars [9]. These are not separate problems; rather they interact in two gigantic complex adaptive systems: the biosphere system and the human socio-economic system. The negative manifestations of these interactions are often referred to as ‘the human predicament’ [10], and determining how to prevent it from generating a global collapse is perhaps the foremost challenge confronting humanity.

The human predicament is driven by **overpopulation**, overconsumption of natural resources and the use of unnecessarily **environmentally damaging tech**nologies and socio-economic-political arrangements to service Homo sapiens’ aggregate consumption [11–17]. How far the human population size now is above the planet’s long-term carrying capacity is suggested (conservatively) by ecological footprint analysis [18–20]. It shows that to support today’s population of seven billion sustainably (i.e. with business as usual, including current technologies and standards of living) would require roughly half an additional planet; to do so, if all citizens of Earth consumed resources at the US level would take four to five more Earths. Adding the projected 2.5 billion more people by 2050 would make the human assault on civilization’s life-support systems disproportionately worse, because almost everywhere people face systems with nonlinear responses [11,21–23], in which environmental damage increases at a rate that becomes faster with each additional person. Of course, the claim is often made that humanity will expand Earth’s carrying capacity dramatically with technological innovation [24], but it is widely recognized that technologies can both add and subtract from carrying capacity. The plough evidently first expanded it and now appears to be reducing it [3]. Overall, careful analysis of the prospects does not provide much confidence that technology will save us [25] or that gross domestic product can be disengaged from resource use [26]

2. Do current trends portend a collapse?

What is the likelihood of this set of interconnected predicaments [27] leading to a global collapse in this century? There have been many definitions and much discussion of past ‘collapses’ [1,3,28–31], but a future global collapse does not require a careful definition. It could be triggered by anything from a ‘small’ nuclear war, whose ecological effects could quickly end civilization [32], to a more gradual breakdown because famines, epidemics and resource shortages cause a disintegration of central control within nations, in concert with disruptions of trade and conflicts over increasingly scarce necessities. In either case, regardless of survivors or replacement societies, the world familiar to anyone reading this study and the well-being of the vast majority of people would disappear. pg. 1-2

### 3

#### Interpretation – “Economic engagement” is limited to trade of goods and services -energy is a non-economic partnership

Rose, 8 -- UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Administration [Andrew, and Mark Spiegel, "Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties," April 2008, [www.nber.org/papers/w13988.pdf?new\_window=1](http://www.nber.org/papers/w13988.pdf?new_window=1)]

Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties We examine the role of non-economic partnerships in promoting international economic exchange. Since far-sighted countries are more willing to join costly international partnerships such as environmental treaties, environmental engagement tends to encourage international lending. Countries with such non-economic partnerships also find it easier to engage in economic exchanges since they face the possibility that debt default might also spill over to hinder their non-economic relationships. We present a theoretical model of these ideas, and then verify their empirical importance using a bilateral cross-section of data on international cross-holdings of assets and environmental treaties. Our results support the notion that international environmental cooperation facilitates economic exchange. Countries, like people, interact with each other on a number of different dimensions. Some interactions are strictly economic; for instance, countries engage in **international trade of goods, services, capital, and labor**. But many are not economic, at least not in any narrow sense. For instance, the United States seeks to promote human rights and democracy, deter nuclear proliferation, stop the spread of narcotics, and so forth. Accordingly America, like other countries, participates in a number of international institutions to further its foreign policy objectives; it has joined security alliances like NATO, and international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this paper, we concentrate on the interesting and understudied case of international environmental arrangements (IEAs). We ask whether participation in such **non-economic** partnerships tends to enhance international economic relations. The answer, in both theory and practice, is positive.

#### Violation – the AFF is an energy partnership

**Voting issue –**

1. **Limits – opening the floodgates to other types of engagement make the topic massive and unpredictable – this hurts NEG preparation, which is key to competitiveness and clash**
2. **Ground – gives them unique advantage areas and guts generics like the politics DA and Neolib K that are key to negative strategy on a topic with few common linkages**

### 4

#### Energy sharing is a vehicle used for interventionist wars – manufactures justification for military conflicts

Langlois-Bertrand 10 (Simon, Defence R&D Canada Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, "The Contemporary Concept of Energy Security," http://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc101/p533868\_A1b.pdf)

The energy security problem, in this view, is thus a purely geostrategic issue, **based on a logic of war**: energy is both the object of war (what states compete for) and the instrument of war (what states compete with).27 The language used in these debates is particularly telling, with the prominent use of terms such as the “oil weapon,” “competition over access,” and “exclusive backyards,” amongst others. Under this logic, energy security is derivative of geopolitics, as the “struggle for energy is (…) subsumed under the ‘normal’ competition for power, survival, land, valuable materials or markets.”28 Consequently, what comes out of these lines of argument is the inherent national dimension to all the discussions. The international oil companies, where mentioned, are often reduced to their home countries. The pillars of this approach to energy security are exemplified in the “regions and empires” narrative. In this storyline, the key change to energy security brought by the crises of the 1970s was an increasingly important geopolitical dimension. This approach would thus “place greater stress on strategic alliances; the search for ‘exclusive backyards’; military power to protect supplies; intra-Western rivalry and undercutting and Western oil companies taking control of production capacity through buy outs and mergers in producer states.”29 The common theme of analysis within this view is the idea that Western consumer countries should be wary of neglecting systematically to “incorporate energy security concerns into the design of their foreign policies.”30 The “regions and empires” narrative also places great importance on unilateral security policy in international energy market dynamics, involving essentially, a division of the world into countries and regions, on the basis of ideology, religion, and political arguments. Political and military strategy, bilateralism and regionalism divide the world up into competing U.S., E.U., Russian and Asian spheres of influence. The absence of effective world markets for strategic goods further stimulates the establishment of bilateral trade relationships and treaties, thus reinforcing the formation of more or less integrated blocks with satellite regions that compete for markets and energy resources.31 With, again, an implicit focus on oil and gas, proponents of this narrative would argue, for instance, that just four states (Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan and Qatar) possess more than half global gas reserves. Consequently, “many [doubt] the extent to which gas would be subjected to market dynamics, with fixed, structural dependence on a small number of producers actually increasing (…) and [lament] that the much heralded take-off of [liquefied natural gas] was proving illusive.”32 These arguments produce a conceptual **framework** for energy security by highlighting more or less three interrelated levels of the (foreign policy) problem: vulnerabilities of the oil and gas supply chain; changes in the oil and gas trade patterns; and changes in geopolitical environments for the supply of oil and gas.33 This is already quite restrictive, but the reasoning can be pushed further through its logical extension: energy becoming an integral part of strategic planning. The situation in Africa and Central Asia leaves little doubt as to the existence of at least some sense of competition over access to resources between core energy players (mostly China, the U.S., and Russia). The arrival of military planning to such problems, however, **inspires “a logic of hardening, securing and protecting**” in the entire domain of energy.34 The military component of energy security is not new, stemming back to at least the establishment of the Carter Doctrine.35 Following the Islamic revolution in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, U.S. President Jimmy Carter delivered a strong message to the world in his 1980 State of the Union address: Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.36 As Michael Klare points out, however, what is most striking with hindsight is not the assertion of the Carter Doctrine itself, but its reassertion and extension by every U.S. President since: after Carter created the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), subsequent Presidents followed with clear actions in support of the Doctrine. At first, it consisted of more “traditional” military actions: Ronald Reagan elevated the RDJTF to a full-scale regional headquarters, and eventually asserted the United States’ determination to protect oil flows in the Gulf by authorizing the “reflagging” of Kuwaiti tankers with the American ensign (and their protection); George H.W. Bush then protected Saudi Arabia against possible Iraqi attack (Operation Desert Shield) and then drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm) in the Persian Gulf War. These actions were soon extended, furthermore, to most other oil-producing regions of the world. The Clinton administration, for instance, pushed for the construction of a new oil pipeline between Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, and began assisting these states with military aid and through a series of annual joint military exercises.37 Finally, after Clinton started this ‘globalization’ of the Carter Doctrine, George W. Bush made it a central objective of American foreign policy, as a consequence of the National Energy Policy announced in 2001.38 Klare and others go on to argue that this militarization, stemming from a **simplified** and overly strategic view of energy security concerns, increase the prospects for conflict and war in years to come. Several mechanisms influence those prospects: the prominence of insurgency and separatist warfare in oil-producing regions; the political violence associated with mechanisms falling under the ‘resource curse’ purview; international terrorism by groups such as Al-Qaeda; increased tensions over contested maritime resource zones as onshore energy sources are depleted; and, more generally, increasing doubts about the future sufficiency of global stockpiles of oil and gas.39 This, on top of the globalization of the Carter Doctrine, leads to a higher potential for conflict. To illustrate this, the most discussed case in the contemporary period is, “a growing risk, therefore, that U.S. and Chinese efforts to militarize their foreign energy endeavours will produce a competitive stance between them and someday spark a dangerous confrontation.”40 As can be expected, not every analyst shares this pessimism over future prospects for international energy dynamics. Fettweis, in a direct rebuttal of Klare’s arguments on the matter, argues that at least three reasons make it unlikely that wars over territories containing resources will be more common in the 21st century: first, fighting to control oil is usually a self-defeating proposition, as seizing oil will always be costlier than buying it; second, both consumers and producers share the same interest in stability; finally, there are fewer instances of any kind of warfare.41 In a different assessment, Daniel Yergin emphasizes the implications of interdependence in international energy markets, and both authors conclude that China and the United States are most likely to end up on the same side if a clash between producing and importing countries should happen again.42 Flowing from these debates, the foreign policy and military approach to energy security also underscores the United States’ special position and role in these matters. These considerations are neither based solely on the U.S. being a powerful actor on the international scene, nor on their use of the military in energy-related policy: other states have considerable influence, and the use of the military to protect the secure flow of oil is common all around the world. What makes the United States a special case is the extent to which their actions influence the global energy situation, giving it a set of responsibilities unequalled by any other state.43 The United States’ leading Cold War role during the 1970s and 1980s, and later on the “globalization” of the Carter Doctrine taken broadly, show that their “system-maintaining role has benefited a number of core states as well as America itself, [by] maintaining a stable supply of crucial energy onto the world market.”44 Finally, some proponents of this approach also see the inherently unstable nature of oil and gas exploitation as reinforcing these dynamics: exploitation of oil and gas, as it has been done in the past few decades, show patterns of increases in national instability, of public and political distrust, and of emergence of destabilizing forms of competition.45 Several different policies are being developed to deal with those issues, but an important policy gap remains in the sense that little attention is paid to changing those underlying dynamics.46 The bottom line is that while this approach has strong appeal, its **limited focus** on oil and gas, and on competition between states, **oversimplifies** issues related to securing energy supplies. Mitigation strategies are often reduced to diversification,47 and the militarizing of the problem **tends to order issues in a hierarchical manner**,48 relegating other important concerns

#### We should be affirming policies that avoid “waste imperialism,” where the First World uses the Third as a giant landfill, producing massive structural inequality while reproducing the myth of the “dirty, foreign” Other

Mannathukkaren 12(Nissim, Associate Professor, International Development Studies, Dalhousie University, “Garbage as our alter ego”, Nov 3, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/garbage-as-our-alter-ego/article4059003.ece)

If there is one thing that is symptomatic of the modern human condition, but hardly recognised as such, it is garbage. **Garbage is capitalism’s dark underbelly**, its pathological alter ego. That is why we keep disavowing it, refusing to believe it exists. Vilappilsala standoff But the more we deny it, it rears its ugly head, as most recently, in Vilappilsala panchayat in Kerala where the standoff between the local people, who are opposed to the reopening of a waste treatment plant, and the State has left 2 lakh tonnes of solid waste lying unprocessed, threatening an environmental disaster. It is, therefore, remarkable that the current boisterous debate on foreign direct investment in multi-brand retail in India has completely ignored the question of garbage. By focusing only on the supposed virtues of waste reduction in perishable goods (like fruits and vegetables) brought about by the better storage facilities of retail conglomerates, the issue of the latter’s humongous ecological footprint (for example, in terms of sprawl, increase in driving, and the proliferation of non-biodegradable waste) has been bypassed. According to a report from The Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Washington, D. C., in the 20-year period from 1990, the same period in which Walmart grew to be a behemoth, the average number of miles that a U.S. household travelled for shopping increased by around 1000. And from 2005 to 2010, despite Walmart’s initiation of a reduced waste programme, its reported greenhouse gas emissions shot up by 14 per cent. Big-box stores don’t just improve efficiency in consumption, they also increase **consumption** manifold, which ultimately **results in phenomenal amounts of trash**. The garbage generated by Americans annually reportedly amounts to 220 million tonnes, and 80 per cent of U.S. goods are used only once before being trashed. In the mythologies of modernisation and development, we sing paeans to skyscrapers and nuclear plants. But there is no accompanying dirge about the costs we have had to pay for them. If there was, then we would have heard of Puente Hills — the largest active landfill/waste dump in the United States, which is a 1,365-acre monstrosity — as much as we have about the World Trade Center or the Empire State Building. It is ironical, Edward Humes tells us in his book Garbology: Our Dirty Love Affair with Trash, to call Puente Hills a “landfill,” for the garbage mountain has long ceased to fill a depression in the land and rises now an unbelievable 500 feet above the ground, a space capable of holding 15 million elephants. It takes, of course, a gargantuan effort, as Humes describes, to keep the toxic substance that leaks out of the 130-million tonne waste (which includes 3 million tonnes of soiled disposable diapers — another “important” invention of modern life) from poisoning groundwater sources. Nevertheless, **waste is seen**, in popular development discourse **as a “third world” problem**, the ubiquitous mountains of garbage that blight the face of cities and towns in the poorer parts of the world — one of the first tasks that the newly-elected President in Egypt had was cleaning up the garbage mess in Cairo. And **the citizens of the third world have internalised this discourse, seeing themselves as part of the “dirty” developing world blissfully unaware of the cost at which a “clean” developed world is maintained**. Thus the story of the Somali pirates plundering the high seas has become a part of global lore but not that of Somalia being a (cheap) dumping ground for some of the most toxic garbage, including nuclear and medical waste, from Europe for the last two decades and more. As long as the streets are clean in Frankfurt and Paris, does it matter that children are born in Somalia without limbs? ‘Waste imperialism’ It is in this context of **“waste imperialism”** that the question of garbage needs to come out of its subterranean existence and occupy centre stage in any discussion on development, including FDI in retail. It is not accidental that **dumping grounds, and waste treatment plants are invariably located in places where the most vulnerable and marginalised sections of the population live**, whether in the developed or developing worlds. Not surprisingly, garbage has become an important political tool in the present with garbage strikes and struggles around garbage taking place in various cities in the West and elsewhere. The contestation in Vilappilsala has been going on since 2000 when the waste treatment plant opened with serious ecological impact. **We would be living in a mythical world if we think that the problems of waste can be solved only with better rational planning, management or recycling**. In the U.S., even after decades of environmental education, only around 24 per cent of the garbage is recycled with nearly 70 per cent of it going into landfills. Simply throwing trash into the recycling bin hardly does anything to reduce the production of rubbish; on the contrary **it might lull us into a false sense of complacency** as Heather Rogers, the author of Gone Tomorrow: The Hidden Life of Garbage argues. This is because household waste constitutes a minuscule percentage of the total waste produced, the vast majority of which is constituted by waste from industrial processes. As she shows, the mantra of recycling and green capitalism has been adopted by corporations and big business because it is the least threatening of the options to profit margins — no wonder, the rate of production of goods and, consequently, trash has only increased. More importantly, in this “greenwashing,” the responsibility of cleaning up the environment is displaced from corporations to people themselves in their own individual, personal capacities. Economy of ‘zero waste’ To be sure, there are rare examples like Germany, which have nearly eliminated landfills, and recycle up to 70 per cent of the waste. But the fact that the Cröbern Central Waste Treatment Plant in Germany, one of the most sophisticated plants in the world (built at a cost of $ 135 million), has been allegedly involved in criminal garbage profiteering by illegally securing solid waste from Italy (to sustain the operations of the plant) shows how tenuous and fragile the economy of “zero waste” is. Ultimately, the problem of waste cannot be fathomed without recognising the order of capitalism, which is built on the relentless production of commodities and the philosophy of planned obsolescence, in which goods are built to have short shelf life. As Sarah Moore of the University of Arizona has pithily pointed out the contradiction: “Modern citizens have come to expect the places they live, work, play, and go to school to be free of garbage — to be ordered and clean. These expectations can never be fully met, however, precisely because the same processes of modernization that have produced them have also produced a situation in which garbage proliferates.” The “golden age of capitalism” is thus also the “golden age of garbage.” Just between 1960 and 1980, solid waste in the U.S. increased by four times. This is the exponential growth in garbage the world over, which has rendered the Pacific Ocean awash with plastic particles thus making plastic outnumber zooplankton at a shocking rate of 6:1. And this is the growth that has ironically made garbage and its disposal a multi-billion dollar business, and has made the mafia enter and control it, as in Italy. Developing countries like India, with almost non-existent waste disposal systems, catastrophically seek to move to the next (superfluous) stage of consumption by imbibing the culture of Walmart. In this scenario, **if justice for both human beings and nature has to be ensured, the alter ego of garbage can no longer be hidden under the carpet. It has to be confronted head on**.

**The judge should vote negative to embrace an aesthetics of voluntary simplicity**

**It’s try-or-die for the alternative – current consumption practices make extinction inevitable – shifting the subject position of the economic imaginary away from producers and towards consumers creates a shift towards creative strategies for simplicity and de-growth**

Alexander 12 Samuel, lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, Australia, “DEGROWTH IMPLIES VOLUNTARY SIMPLICITY: OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION”, Simplicity Institute Report 12b, 2012)

The global economy is exceeding the sustainable carrying capacity of the planet, and it has been for some time (Global Footprint Network, 2012; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). This ‘ecological overshoot’ is being driven by the escalation and expansion of Western-­‐style consumer lifestyles, which are highly resource and energy intensive. It is now commonplace to acknowledge that humankind would need more than five planets if North American lifestyles were universalised (e.g. Scott, 2009: 2). With the global population expected to reach 9 billion by mid-­‐century, it is increasingly clear that these high consumption lifestyles are unsustainable and certainly not universalizable. The science of climate change, furthermore, implies that we must decarbonise consumer lifestyles without delay (Hansen, 2011), and the spectre of ‘peak oil’ suggests that the supply of cheap petroleum upon which consumer societies and their growth-­‐orientated economies are based, may be coming to an end (Heinberg, 2011; Alexander, 2011a). All this means that ‘business as usual’ is simply not an option, and it may well be that the persistent delays in responding to these serious issues means that it is now too late to avoid some form of ‘great disruption’ to life as we know it (Gilding, 2011). What makes this admittedly gloomy situation even more troubling is that empirical research shows that many of those who have attained the Western-­‐style consumerist ideal may not be finding such lifestyles all that fulfilling (Lane, 2000). Technological progress and economic growth, it would seem, cannot solve all our problems or answer for us the question of how we ought to live. For these reasons, among others, it has never been more urgent to rethink contemporary practices of consumption. But the news is not all grim. The fact that many in the global consumer class are not finding high consumption lifestyles particularly fulfilling raises the tantalizing possibility that people could increase their quality of life by voluntarily reducing their material and energy consumption. This is sometimes called the ‘double dividend’ of sustainable consumption (Jackson, 2005), for the reason that ‘simpler’ lifestyles of reduced consumption can benefit the planet while also being in the immediate and long-­‐ term self-­‐interest of the individual (Brown and Kasser, 2005). Exchanging some superfluous consumption for more free time is one path to this ‘double dividend.’ Reducing superfluous consumption can also open up space for a ‘triple’ or even ‘quadruple’ dividend, on the grounds that low-­‐consumption lifestyles of voluntary simplicity have the potential to generate communitarian or humanitarian benefits too (e.g. by leaving more resources for others in greater need). It has even been suggested that lifestyles of voluntary simplicity, focusing as they do on non-­‐materialistic forms of meaning and fulfilment, might provide something of an antidote to the spiritual malaise that seemingly inflicts many people within materialistic cultures today (Alexander, 2011b; Myers, 2000). But if indeed there are multiple dividends to sustainable consumption, including self-­‐interested ones, why does the global consumer class consume so much? Are we not free to step out of the rat race and simply consume less? Unfortunately, things are not that simple. Our lifestyle decisions, especially our consumption decisions, are not made in a vacuum. Instead, they are made within social, economic, and political structures of constraint, and those structures make some lifestyle decisions easy or necessary and other lifestyle decisions difficult or impossible. Change the social, economic, and political structures, however, and different consumption practices would or could emerge. With a practical focus, this paper seeks to develop some of the theoretical work that has already been done in this area (Jackson and Papathanasopoulou, 2008; Jackson, 2003; Sanne, 2002; Ropke, 1999). More specifically, this paper examines the extent to which people in consumer societies are ‘locked in’ to high consumption, energy-­‐intensive lifestyles, and it explores ways that structural changes could facilitate a societal transition to practices of more sustainable consumption. This subject should be of interest to all those broadly engaged in work on sustainability, for the reasons outlined in the opening paragraph. But it should be of particular interest to those who have been convinced that the richest nations, if indeed they are serious about realising a sustainable world, ought to be initiating a degrowth process of planned economic contraction, with the aim of moving toward a socially desirable, ecologically sustainable, steady state economy (Kallis, 2011, Alexander, 2012a). It barely needs stating that a degrowth or steady state economy will never emerge voluntarily within societies that are generally comprised of individuals seeking ever-­‐higher levels of income and consumption. It follows that any transition to such an economy will depend upon people in those societies transitioning away from consumer lifestyles and embracing lifestyles of reduced and restrained consumption. This may seem like an unlikely cultural revolution, and it is, but if it is a necessary cultural precondition to the emergence of a degrowth or steady state economy, then it is an issue of critical importance that ought to be given due attention. In short, a macroeconomics of degrowth imply lifestyles of voluntary simplicity, in much the same way as a macroeconomics of limitless growth imply lifestyles of insatiable consumption. If it is the case, however, that contemporary consumer societies are structured in such a way to oppose lifestyles of voluntary simplicity, then it is important that those structures are exposed and challenged. Put otherwise, we must understand how our societies function to lock people into high consumption lifestyles and then set about changing those structures to better facilitate practices of sustainable consumption. Structural change will not be enough, on its own, of course; there also needs to be a shift in values (Murtaza, 2011). However, it is tragic to think that there are some people living consumer lifestyles today who genuinely want to consume more sustainably, but who find it difficult or impossible, for structural reasons, to actually live lives of voluntary simplicity and put those values fully into practice. It is more tragic still if those consumerist structures are inhibiting people from increasing their quality of life through reduced consumption. This paper seeks to deepen the understanding of the relationship between consumer behaviour and the structures which shape that behaviour, in the hope that the existing barriers to sustainable consumption can be overcome.

### Case

**Consequences matter – the tunnel vision of moral absolutism generates evil and political irrelevance**

Issac, 2002 (Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring)

Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, **an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: **(1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intentions does not ensure the achievement of what one intends.** Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but **if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters**; **(2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity** is not simply a form of powerlessness, it **is often a form of complicity in injustice.** This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and **(3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives** of action, **that is most significant**. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, **it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil.** **This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic** and historically contextualized **ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment.** It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. **And it undermines political effectiveness.**

#### Using the federal government kills movements

**Nayar, 99** – Professor at the University of Warwick School of Law (Jayan, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity”, Fall, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599)

The discussion above was intended to provide a perspective of world-order as an historical process of ordering which, contrary to the benign symbolism of universalism evoked by notions such as "one world" and "global village," is constructed out of the violent destruction of diverse socialities. World-order, when re-viewed, therefore, may be understood as follows:. As a concept that seeks to articulate the civilizational project of humanity, it is at best nonsense, and at worst a fraudulent ideology of legitimization for the perpetuation of colonizing violence--"world-order" as symbolic violence. As a material reality of violent social relations, it is a conscious and systematized design for the control of resources through the disciplining of minds and bodies--"world-order" as embodied violence.

#### Thinking globally on environmental issues excludes the common people who are key to solving environmental problems

**Esteva and Prakash, 1998** (Gustavo, Latin American critic of development who has served as the Interim Chairman of the UN Research Institute for Social Development Board and as President of the 5th World Congress on Rural Sociology, and Madhu Suri, she has a Ph.D. in philosophy of education from the Syracuse University and is currently Professor of Educational theory and practice at Penn State University, “Grassroots Post-Modernism”, pp. 22-23, Zed Books Ltd.)

Once environmental "problems" are reduced to the ozone layer or to global warming , to planetary "sources" and "sinks," faith in the futility of local efforts is fed by global experts; while their conferences, campaigns and institutions present the fabulous apparition of solutions "scientifically" pulled out of the "global hat." Both a global consciousness and a global government (such as the Global Environmental Facility "master- minded" at the Earth Summit) appear as badly needed to manage the planets "scarce resources" and "the masses" irresponsibly chopping "green sinks" for their daily tortillas or chappatis, threatening the "experts`" planetary designs for eco-development. The "ozone layer" or "global warming` are abstract hypotheses, offered by some scientists as an explanation of recent phenomena. Even in that condition, they could prove to be very useful for fostering critical awareness of the folly of the "social minorities." But they are promoted as "a fact," reality itself; and all the socio-political and ecological dangers inherent in the illusion of the "Global Management" of planet Earth are hidden from "the people." Excluded, for example, from critical scrutiny is the reflection that in order for "global thinking" to be feasible, we should be able to "think" mum within every culture on Earth and come away from this excursion tingle-minded e clearly a logical and practical impossibility; once it is critically de-mythologized, For it requires the supra—cultural criteria of "thinlking" - implying the dissolution of the subject who `"thinks"; or assuming that it is possible to "think" outside of the culture in which every man and woman on Earth is immersed. The human condition does not allow such operations. We celebrate the hopefulness of common men and women, saved from the hubris of "scientific man," unchastened by all his failures at playing God.

#### This means the AFF fails – reliance on the federal government reinscribes their impacts

**Nayar 99**, (Jayan, Law Student at the University of Warwick, Re-Framing International Law for the 21st Century: Orders of Inhumanity, 9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 599, Fall 1999)

So, back to the question: to what extent, for this, "our world," do we contemplate change when "we" imagine transformed "world-orders?" In addition to the familiar culprits of violent orderings, such as government, financial institutions, transnational corporations, the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO (as significant culprits they indeed are), do we, in our contemplations of violent orders, vision our locations within corporate "educational" institutions as "professional academics" and "researchers," our locations within corporate NGOs as "professional activists," our locations within "think-tanks" and "research organizations" as "professional policy-formulators," and whatever other locations of elite "expertise" we have been "trained" to possess, as ordered sites, complicit and parasitic, within a violent "world-order"? Do we see in our critiques of world-orderings, out there, the orderings we find, right here, in our bodies, minds, relationships, expectations, fears and hopes? Would we be willing to see "our (ordered) world" dismantled in order that other worlds, wherein our "privileges" become extinguished, may flourish? These concerns are, then, I believe, the real complexities of judgment and action. **Consideration should be given**, not only to those of the political-structural, so often honed in on, but also **to the** [\*628] **issue of the political-personal, which ultimately is the "unit" of "worlds" and of "orders." If "globalization," as a recent obsession of intellectual minds, has contributed anything to an understanding of the ways of the "world,"** I suggest, **it is that we cannot escape "our" implication within the violence of "world (mis)orders."**

IV. A WORLD FOR TRANSFORMATION: TWO POEMS

Despite the fixation of the beneficiaries of ordered worlds, **even the ordered "critic," with the prescribed languages, visions and possibilities of human socialities, other realities of humanity nevertheless persist.** Notwithstanding the globalization of social concern and the transnationalization of professionalized critique and reformatory action, struggles against violence remain energized, persistent and located. They are waged through the bodies of lives lived in experiential locations against real instruments of terror, functioning within embodied sites of violence. Non-information and non-representation of the existence of such struggles, and non-learning of the wisdoms thus generated do not negate their truths or the vibrancy of their socialities. n51

**"We" are participants in ordered worlds, not merely observers. The choice is whether we wish to recognize our own locations of ordered violence and participate in the struggle to resist their orderings, or whether we wish merely to observe violence in far-off worlds in order that our interventionary participation "out there" never destabilizes the ground upon which we stand.** I suggest that **we betray the spirit of transformatory struggle, despite all our expressions of support and even actions of professionalized expertise, if our own locations, within which are ordered and from which we ourselves order, remain unscrutinized.**

**By creating defining circumstances in which poverty exists, the AFF not only contributes to the problem, but can't solve it**

**KAPPELER 1995** [Susanne Kappeler, The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, pg 1-4]

What is striking is that the violence which is talked about is always the violence committed by someone else: women talk about the violence of men, adults about the violence of young people; the left, liberals and the centre about the violence of right extremists; the right, centre and liberals about the violence of leftist extremists; political activists talk about structural violence, police and politicians about violence in the `street', and all together about the violence in our society. Similarly, Westerners talk about violence in the Balkans, Western citizens together with their generals about the violence of the Serbian army. Violence is recognized and measured by its visible effects, the spectacular blood of wounded bodies, the material destruction of objects, the visible damage left in the world of `objects'. In its measurable damage we see the proof that violence has taken place, the violence being reduced to this damage. The violation as such, or invisible forms of violence - the non-physical violence of threat and terror, of insult and humiliation, the violation of human dignity - are hardly ever the issue except to some extent in feminist and anti-racist analyses, or under the name of psychological violence. Here violence is recognized by the victims and defined from their perspective - an important step away from the catalogue of violent acts and the exclusive evidence of material traces in the object. Yet even here the focus tends to be on the effects and experience of violence, either the objective and scientific measure of psychological damage, or the increasingly subjective definition of violence as experience. Violence is perceived as a phenomenon for science to research and for politics to get a grip on. But violence is not a phenomenon: it is the behaviour of people, human action which may be analysed. What is missing is an analysis of violence as action - not just as acts of violence, or the cause of its effects, but as the actions of people in relation to other people and beings or things. Feminist critique, as well as other political critiques, has analysed the preconditions of violence, the unequal power relations which enable it to take place. However, under the pressure of mainstream science and a sociological perspective which increasingly dominates our thinking, it is becoming standard to argue as if it were these power relations which cause the violence. Underlying is a behaviourist model which prefers to see human action as the exclusive product of circumstances, ignoring the personal decision of the agent to act, implying in turn that circumstances virtually dictate certain forms of behaviour. Even though we would probably not underwrite these propositions in their crass form, there is nevertheless a growing tendency, not just in social science, to explain violent behaviour by its circumstances. (Compare the question, `Does pornography cause violence?') The circumstances identified may differ according to the politics of the explainers, but the method of explanation remains the same. While consideration of mitigating circumstances has its rightful place in a court of law trying (and defending) an offender, this does not automatically make it an adequate or sufficient practice for political analysis. It begs the question, in particular, `What is considered to be part of the circumstances (and by whom)?' Thus in the case of sexual offenders, there is a routine search - on the part of the tabloid press or professionals of violence - for experiences of violence in the offender's own past, an understanding which is rapidly solidifying in scientific model of a `cycle of violence'. That is, the relevant factors are sought in the distant past and in other contexts of action, e a crucial factor in the present context is ignored, namely the agent's decision to act as he did. Even politically oppositional groups are not immune to this mainstream sociologizing. Some left groups have tried to explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence of Black men as the result of racist oppression. The ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism and racism, **yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it**. Although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life context, these `explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses violence, that is, that these circumstances do not `cause' violent behaviour. They overlook, in other words, that the perpetrator has decided to violate, even if this decision was made in circumstances of limited choice. To overlook this decision, however, is itself a political decision, serving particular interests. In the first instance it serves to exonerate the perpetrators, whose responsibility is thus transferred to circumstances and a history for which other people (who remain beyond reach) are responsible. Moreover, it helps to stigmatize all those living in poverty and oppression; because they are obvious victims of violence and oppression, they are held to be potential perpetrators themselves.' This slanders all the women who have experienced sexual violence, yet do not use violence against others, and libels those experiencing racist and class oppression, yet do not necessarily act out violence. Far from supporting those oppressed by classist, racist or sexist oppression, it sells out these entire groups in the interest of exonerating individual members. It is a version of collective victim-blaming, of stigmatizing entire social strata as potential hotbeds of violence, which rests on and perpetuates the mainstream division of society into so-called marginal groups - the classic clienteles of social work and care politics (and of police repression) - and an implied `centre' to which all the speakers, explainers, researchers and careers themselves belong, and which we are to assume to be a zone of non-violence. Explaining people's violent behaviour by their circumstances also has the advantage of implying that the `solution' lies in a change to circumstances. Thus it has become fashionable among socially minded politicians and intellectuals in Germany to argue that the rising neo-Nazi violence of young people (men), especially in former East Germany, needs to be countered by combating poverty and unemployment in these areas. Likewise anti-racist groups like the Anti. Racist Alliance or the Anti-Nazi League in Britain argue that `the causes of racism, like poverty and unemployment, should be tackled and that it is `problems like unemployment and bad housing which lead to racism'.' Besides being no explanation at all of why (white poverty and unemployment should lead specifically to racist violence (and what would explain middle- and upper-class racism), it is more than questionable to combat poverty only (but precisely) when and where violence is exercised. It not only legitimates the violence (by `explaining' it), but constitutes an incentive to violence, confirming that social problems will be taken seriously when and where `they attract attention by means of violence - just as the most unruly children in schools (mostly boys) tend to get more attention from teachers than well-behaved and quiet children (mostly girls). Thus if German neo-Nazi youths and youth groups, since their murderous assaults on refugees and migrants in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Dresden etc., are treated to special youth projects and social care measures (to the tune of DM 20 million per year), including `educative' trips to Morocco and Israel,' this is am unmistakable signal to society that racist violence does indeed 'pay off'.

**The result is terminal failure. Impositions can't solve, localized politics are key**

**KAPPELER 1995** [Susanne Kappeler, *The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,* pg 4-5]

If we nevertheless continue to explain violence by its 'circumstances' and attempt to counter it by changing these circumstances, it is also because in this way we stay in command of the problem. In particular, we do not complicate the problem by any suggestion that it might be people who need to change. Instead, we turn the perpetrators of violence into the victims of circumstances, who as victims by definition cannot act sensibly (but in changed circumstances will behave differently). `We', on the other hand, are the subjects able to take in hand the task of changing the circumstances. Even if changing the circumstances - combating poverty, unemployment, injustice etc. - may not be easy, it nevertheless remains within `our' scope, at least theoretically and by means of state power. Changing people, on the other hand, is neither within our power nor, it seems, ultimately in our interest: we prefer to keep certain people under control, putting limits on their violent behaviour, but we apparently have no interest in a politics that presupposes people's ability to change and aims at changing attitudes and behaviour. For changing (as opposed to restricting) other people's behaviour is beyond the range and influence of our own power; only they themselves can change it. It requires their will to change, their will not to abuse power and not to use violence. A politics aiming at a change in people's behaviour would require political work that is very much more cumbersome and very much less promising of success than is the use of state power and social control. It would require political consciousness-raising - politicizing the way we think - which cannot be imposed on others by force or compulsory educational measures. It would require a view of people which takes seriously and reckons with their will, both their will to violence or their will to change. To take seriously the will of others however would mean recognizing one's own, and putting people's will, including our own, at the centre of political reflection.''